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Localising National Accountability 
Claims in Fragile Settings: 
The Right to Food Campaign 
in India*
Anuradha Joshi1 and Aheli Chowdhury2
Abstract How does a national movement go local in places with multiple 
armed actors, simultaneously retaining credibility at the grass roots, while 
making claims and negotiating with the state? This article explores how 
a rights-based movement, the Right to Food (RTF) in India, with a strong 
national core and some state-level support expanded into areas that were 
experiencing militant insurgency. We find that the RTF movement was able 
to coexist with the militant groups because the movement: (a) brought 
new framings and issues to existing groups that were already working with 
vulnerable populations; and (b) distinguished itself from the militant groups 
in terms of substantive issues and approach (avoiding issues of displacement 
and land rights), as it was willing to work with the state to tackle issues of 
hunger and food entitlements.
Keywords: India, Right to Food, grass-roots action, fragility, conflict, 
armed militancy, Naxalite, social movements, socioeconomic rights.
1 Introduction
How does a national movement go local in places with multiple armed 
actors, while simultaneously retaining credibility at the grass roots and 
making claims and negotiating with the state? This article explores 
how a rights-based movement, the Right to Food (RTF) in India, with 
a strong national core and some state-level support, expanded into 
areas that were experiencing militant insurgency, which was in part 
rooted in the lack of  rights among those populations. The setting is 
one of  subnational locations in India where the state is repressive 
and militarised and in which, therefore, civil and political rights are 
curtailed. How does the RTF movement work in these locations 
dominated by extremists, while retaining a commitment to achieving 
rights through the law? To what extent do the claims of  the armed 
militants converge with the broader RTF movement?
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Since the 2000s, India has witnessed a wave of  rights-based movements 
for accountability for socioeconomic rights. Starting with the National 
Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI), many of  
these movements have managed to win significant gains through 
progressive legislation, including the Right to Information Act (RTI) 
2005, Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act (MGNREGA) 2005, the Forest Rights Act 2006, the Right to 
Education Act 2009, and the National Food Security Act 2013. The 
trajectory of  these struggles often follows a common storyline: a small 
movement (either grass-roots-based or comprising a small organisation 
with middle-class activists) escalates from a relatively local struggle to a 
national movement which then succeeds in shifting national policy. The 
story of  the RTI Act, starting with the efforts of  the Mazdoor Kisan 
Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) to ensure minimum wages for workers on 
public works programmes in the state of  Rajasthan and moving to the 
national level lobbying for a Right to Information Act with the newly 
elected Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, 
exemplifies this narrative (Pande 2014; Baviskar 2010; Singh 2010; 
Jenkins and Goetz 1999).
Yet, this perspective on scaling up of  local struggles, while important, 
neglects an equally important trajectory: how do such efforts once they 
reach the national level, reach back to the grass roots, in locations where 
they have few roots, and succeed in broadening their base? Existing 
literature offers few clues. It has tended to focus on the operations of  
movements themselves, including how movements sustain over decades 
through high and low levels of  mobilisation on the ground (Isserman 
1987; Morris 1984; Tilly 1978; Whittier 1995); how interactions of  
organisational structures and political opportunity structures shape 
the continuity and character of  the movement over time (Whittier 
1997); and how within social movements, internal heterogeneities 
and subgroups of  interest are suppressed in the interest of  broader 
strategy (Sharp et al. 2000; Dwivedi 1997, 1998; Baviskar 1995). While 
these studies highlight essential aspects of  movement dynamics and 
operations, there is less attention on understanding how movements 
sustain their presence on the ground, particularly in settings of  fragility, 
conflict, and violence. Baviskar’s (1997) work on Narmada Bachao 
Andolan (NBA) that operated in a similar terrain to the RTF movement 
reveals the complex relationship of  the tribal groups with nature, the 
state, and the co-habiting middle-class activists, but does not shed much 
light on how the movement negotiated space within settings of  conflict 
and violence.
This article focuses on this less studied dynamic – of  the downward 
diffusion of  social movements – drawing upon the experience of  the 
RTF campaign in India in three states affected by left-wing extremism 
(LWE).3 The evolution of  the well-known RTF campaign in India is 
a good case to explore these questions. The campaign originated with 
a Supreme Court Case, in which a human rights group – the People’s 
Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) – charged the government with 
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inaction in preventing deaths through starvation while there was surplus 
food rotting in government storage silos (Birchfield and Corsi 2010). 
The campaign gathered some credibility and momentum through 
the interventions of  the Supreme Court in the form of  orders that 
mandated the government to take immediate action to prevent any 
form of  starvation and hunger and to consider it as their (central and 
state) primary responsibility.
The Supreme Court appointed ‘Commissioners’ to monitor 
implementation of  all orders relating to the case. The orders of  the 
court then became a rallying point around which activists and groups 
in different states came together to form the RTF campaign. The 
campaign remained a loose network of  groups and individuals who 
provided ground-level information about implementation of  the 
court orders to the Office of  the Commissioners. The story of  the 
evolution of  the campaign from this small beginning to the passing of  
the National Food Security Act in 2013 has been already documented 
to some extent and will only be touched on lightly here (Hertel 2015; 
Srinivasan and Narayanan 2007).
What is often less stressed is that the RTF campaign, supported 
by the Supreme Court orders, has been extensively animated by 
unrelenting national-level advocacy by the Supreme Court Office of  
the Commissioners in New Delhi. Simultaneously, the same office, 
in coordination with the RTF campaign, has made a concerted 
effort to foreground issues of  food entitlements to civil society groups 
at the subnational level.4 The Office of  the Commissioners at the 
subnational level worked in tandem with RTF campaign members, in 
monitoring the implementation of  the Supreme Court orders in the 
states. They played a key role in the investigation of  deaths through 
starvation, mobilising awareness of  relevant orders (prior to the act 
passing), establishing monitoring mechanisms such as public hearings, 
and linking groups to national-level action. Yet, this subnational 
story has been less explored, particularly of  how the state-level RTF 
campaign mobilised and linked local groups to the national campaign. 
Of  particular interest, and so far undocumented, is how this process 
unfolded in states such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Bihar, 
and Andhra Pradesh, which are dominated by large tribal populations 
and are substantially affected by violent conflict due to the presence of  
Maoist-inspired LWE groups.
It is only recently that the literature has been engaging with issues 
of  how rights-oriented court judgments are complied with (or not) 
and the role of  social movements within them (Langford, Rodríguez-
Garavito and Rossi 2017). Assessing a number of  cases, they conclude 
that, ‘particularly important appears to be the degree and extent of  
internal mobilisation amongst litigants, the strength of  leadership in affected 
communities and the types of  alliances in the enforcement phase’ (ibid.: 25). 
Simultaneously, the literature on the role of  law in social change 
acknowledges that favourable judgments might not be enforceable. 
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Social movements view the courts as only one of  the many arenas within 
which struggles occur (Hunt 1993; Joshi 2010). The hope is that legal 
judgments shape the way issues are conceived and discussed both by the 
aggrieved parties as well as the broader public (McCann 1994).
In addition, judgments provide protection for social mobilisation – 
‘being on the right side of  the law’. As Rohit De (2018) shows in his 
recent book on the cases brought under the Constitution immediately 
post-independence, even when the court failed to uphold rights, 
activism was still important in shaping the law, as well as the range 
of  other actions that organised groups took against the state. Thus, 
courts in practice offer both: a remedy for the rights violations as 
well as cover for social mobilisation. Viewed in this manner, the RTF 
campaign’s spread into conflict-affected states is natural, but also poses 
an additional challenge for such accountability work in fragile settings: 
how does a movement navigate the terrain with multiple armed actors, 
retain credibility at the grass roots, and simultaneously make claims and 
negotiate with the state without appearing threatening?
Based on interviews with state- and national-level RTF activists in 
three such states,5 this article offers insights into how social movements 
manage alliances and garner support, in contexts of  violent conflict and 
the presence of  alternative groups (sometimes armed), with different 
ideologies that might equally draw support from, and are embedded 
in, local communities. Three key features of  such downward diffusion 
stand out. First, not surprisingly, when entering new and particularly 
fragile, complex terrain, the experience of  the RTF shows that they 
have to focus efforts on reorienting existing groups towards food, rather 
than attempting to start new groups from scratch. Second, the RTF, 
like many movements, attempts to balance a confrontational stance 
towards government, with an engaged, cooperative stance as a strategy 
for increased effectiveness. The RTF is seen as a group that clearly has 
state allegiance and works within the framework of  the Constitution 
to hold the state accountable. In the contexts of  conflict, however, this 
becomes imperative for avoiding being targeted as a terror-supporting 
organisation.
Simultaneously though, such balancing puts credibility with the local 
populations under constant jeopardy. In the recent past, there has been 
an increasing incidence of  mass-scale displacement and suppression 
of  the dissenting population in these states. This has further intensified 
the crisis within the local population and how they view the state. 
Paradoxically though, as we show, it is this ‘working with the state’, 
which seems to have been the reason why the RTF has managed to 
work in areas with LWE presence. Finally, the case shows that despite an 
initial separation of  issue areas related to food and livelihoods security, 
both the RTF campaign and the LWE are evolving towards similar 
positions on key issues – a fact that is not surprising given that both are 
seeking legitimacy for their work from local populations whose primary 
need is material and social wellbeing.
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The article is laid out in the following way. Sections 2 and 3 provide 
some background to the RTF campaign and the Naxalite movement 
in India. This is followed by two substantive sections that present the 
interview findings – Section 4 details how the RTF campaign operated 
within these states and Section 5 shows why they were able to coexist 
peacefully with the LWE groups. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Right to Food campaign
The RTF campaign is usually considered to have started with the Civil 
Writ Petition 196/2001, filed by the PUCL against the Union of  India 
and others. The core contention was that the government had not acted 
to prevent deaths through starvation in the country despite holding a 
large stock of  food grains under the Public Distribution Scheme (PDS), 
which was aimed at food security for the poor through the provision of  
subsidised food grains. The case, popularly known as the ‘Right to Food’ 
case, was soon to become the longest running mandamus on the right to 
food in the world (see Figure 1). The Supreme Court, through two key 
steps was instrumental in shaping the trajectory of  the RTF campaign 
in the country (Sinha et al. 2014).
First, it passed close to 200 interim orders in the case, requiring the 
government to undertake action on a range of  food-related issues, 
including school midday meals, supplementary nutrition for pregnant 
and lactating mothers, the food subsidy scheme, pensions, and 
maternity benefits. These orders converted government programmes 
into legal entitlements. Second, it created a Supreme Court Office of  
the Commissioners, and appointed two Commissioners – N.C. Saxena 
and S.R. Sankaran (who was later replaced by Harsh Mander) – 
ex-government bureaucrats, to monitor the implementation of  the 
interim orders in the states. The Commissioners were sympathetic 
to framing food as a right and attracted staff who were either drawn 
from food-related civil society groups, or sympathetic to them – to the 
extent that the Office of  the Commissioners was deeply allied with the 
RTF campaign. Many of  the state-level advisors of  the Commission 
were simultaneously part of  local activism and played the dual role of  
monitoring as well advocacy.
This consequential RTF case and related campaign had its origins in 
the prevalence of  hunger and starvation deaths in the state of  Rajasthan 
where the PUCL chapter had been the node for a network of  civil society 
organisations (including MKSS, which was the grass-roots organisation at 
the heart of  the RTI movement). The initial shoots of  the campaign found 
support in progressive human rights lawyers including Colin Gonzalves 
and journalists such as P. Sainath, who highlighted the paradox of  
‘hunger amidst plenty’ and reformist bureaucrats such as B.N. Yugandhar, 
Abhijit Sen, and Syeda Hamid at the Planning Commission. The 
campaign quickly morphed into a loosely knit, non-funded, decentralised 
network of  grass-roots groups and activists united in their commitment 
to the ‘realisation of  the right to food in India’.6 Most of  these 
grass-roots groups in the states were part of  other networks such as the 
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Figure 1 The Right to Food campaign, India
Source Authors’ own.
2001
As an offshoot of the Supreme Court case, the Right to 
Food campaign is formed.
2002
The Supreme Court through interim orders appoints 
Dr N.C. Saxena and Mr S.R. Shankaran as ‘Commissioners’ 
for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of all 
orders relating to the Right to Food case. 
Subsequently, a subnational Office of the Commissioners 
was set up with advisors to assist the national 
Commissioners in monitoring implementation.
2003
Bhopal, June 2004
2005  
Responding to the long-standing demand of the 
campaign, the government passed the MGNREGA. 
It was passed in 2005, but implemented from 
February 2006 onwards.
Kolkata, November 2005
2007
Bodhgaya, April 2007
2009
Rourkhela, August 2010
2013
Gujarat, April 2014
2017
Ranchi, September 2017
Writ Petition submitted to the Supreme Court of India 
by the People’s Union of Civil Liberties, Rajasthan. The 
case thereafter known as the PUCL vs Union of India 
and others, Writ Petition 196 of 2001. The petition 
asks the court to order the Government of Rajasthan 
to (a) provide immediate open-ended employment in 
drought-affected villages, (b) provide ‘gratuitous relief’ to 
persons unable to work, (c) raise the Public Distribution 
Scheme (PDS) entitlement per family, and (d) provide 
subsidised food grain to all families. Finally, the petition 
requests the court to order the central government to 
supply free food grain for these programmes.
9 April 2002: Day of action on Mid-Day Meal (       ) 
Instrumental in persuading several state governments to 
initiate cooked midday meals in primary schools. 
Six National Conventions (    ) on food-related issues 
held to date. These conventions discussed issues, took stock 
of the implementation of the Supreme Court Orders at 
the subnational level, and also planned future action.
May–June 2005: Rozgar Adhikar Yatra (     ), 
a 50-day tour of India’s poorest districts to demand for 
immediate enactment of the MGNREGA.
September: At a day-long convention in Delhi, the 
Right to Food campaign drafted a set of common 
‘essential demands’ for the National Food Security Act. 
Based on this, the campaign formulates the draft 
Right to Food Act.
September: The Government of India passed the 
National Food Security Act, 2013.
February: The Supreme Court closes the 
Right to Food case.
2000
Present
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National Alliance for People’s Movements and the RTI campaign, and 
worked on issues of  land and displacement, health, education, and others.
Given the salience of  the RTF case, the sweeping orders being issued by 
the Supreme Court, the formation of  the Supreme Court Office of  the 
Commissioners, and the significance of  the media in placing the issues 
on the national agenda, the RTF campaign very soon became more 
active at the national level advocating for a Right to Food Act. Between 
2009 and 2013 when the idea of  passing a food security act was being 
drafted, the campaign focused its energies on influencing the contents 
of  the proposed act, consulting heavily with its membership, and was 
fairly influential in shaping the final draft.7 The National Food Security 
Act was finally passed in 2013 by the Congress-led UPA government. It 
was one of  the last rights-based laws to be passed by the UPA before it 
fell from power in the 2014 elections.
This is not to say that grass-roots campaign work in the states was 
not ongoing; just that it was not as much in the limelight at the time. 
The campaign and affiliated organisations at the state level launched 
awareness-raising activities, social audits, protest marches, and held at 
least 16 high-level conventions on the right to food or related issues over 
a period of  14 years.8 What is less appreciated is the issue of  how the 
RTF campaign managed to work in states such as Bihar, West Bengal, 
Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra 
where it did not have a strong presence on the ground initially and 
which had several districts with a heavy presence of  LWE groups. 
In these states, high levels of  poverty, large tribal and schedule caste 
populations combine with an inhospitable terrain of  forest and hills, 
making these locations well suited for guerrilla tactics, and particularly 
inhospitable to mainstream civil society movements. We turn to the 
origins and ideology of  these LWE groups next.
3 The Naxalite movement and marginalised groups
The ‘Naxalite’ movement has its roots in Naxalbari, in north Bengal, 
where in 1967 a peasant uprising broke out with the support of  the 
Communist Party of  India (Marxist) (CPI-Marxist). Three veteran 
leaders of  the party – Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal, and Jangal 
Santhal – had been mobilising the peasants against oppression by 
the landlords. Peasants forcibly occupied land, burnt land records, 
and looted property, establishing a stronghold in the region. The 
government reacted by sending police to crush the movement, with 
the police opening fire, resulting in the death of  nine villagers. These 
actions by the government were widely criticised and had wide-reaching 
impacts in terms of  triggering similar movements across the tribal-
dominated states nearby. Since then, the Naxalite movement, drawing 
upon Maoist ideology, continues to affect several states in India where 
the LWE groups have established guerrilla bases. In 2006, more than 
60 districts across ten states were affected by LWE. By 2009, the 
Naxalites were influential across approximately 180 districts in ten states 
of  India (Giri 2009; Planning Commission 2008).
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The basic driver of  LWE was the failure of  the state to implement 
the Fifth and Ninth Schedules of  the Constitution of  India which 
call for autonomous self-governance and land reforms.9 No state has 
so far implemented the Fifth Schedule, and only three states have 
implemented land reforms – West Bengal, Jammu and Kashmir, and 
Kerala – and even in these, the reforms have been incomplete. This lack 
of  implementation led to the rise of  the Naxalite movement supported 
by local tribal and marginalised populations. The core challenge is that 
of  feudalism, and the aim of  the movement is to overthrow landlords 
and regain control of  natural resources (land, forests), which are the 
primary source of  livelihoods for the tribal populations. In this, the 
LWEs contrast with more mainstream left parties which view the 
main challenge to be that of  the economy with its colonial roots, and 
integration into the system of  global capitalism. As Prasad notes,
The nature of  left politics in India has been structured by this 
difference in interpretation, while Naxalites and Maoists have 
preferred to interpret the power structure in rural India as 
semi-feudal, the nature of  capitalist relations in agriculture and allied 
sectors had remained the focus of  other left parties. Therefore it is 
not surprising that the growth of  the Maoist movement has been far 
greater in places that have not experienced either land reforms or 
high agricultural growth (Prasad 2010: 7).
These struggles have taken different forms in the different states 
affected by LWE. In Bihar, there are two streams within the movement: 
the CPI (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI ML) Liberation which is considered 
‘revisionist’ by the other Naxalites; and the amalgamation of  the 
CPI (ML)-People’s War and the Maoist Communist Centre, in 2004 
to form a new party, the CPI (Maoist), also known as CPI (M).10 The 
core support in Bihar has tended to be from landless agricultural 
labourers or poor peasants, often from the lowest castes (Bhatia 2005). 
In Chhattisgarh, the expansion of  the Maoists was the result of  the 
formation and influence of  the People’s War Group in Andhra Pradesh, 
which started operating in the Dandakaranya region in the district of  
Bastar that borders Andhra Pradesh. In the 1990s, they formed two 
organisations, the Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor Sangathana 
(DAKMS) and the Krantikari Mahila Adivasi Sangathana (KMAS).
Prasad (2010) notes that although the Maoists gained support by 
focusing on issues of  daily importance, their practices lasted only 
until they gained control, after which they ruled through coercion and 
ruthless elimination of  opposition. In Jharkhand, the main group, 
the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), appears to have mobilised 
support through running a protection racket for the rural elite, 
offering protection to the resources of  the state, as well as protection 
from its own excesses, rather than being a poor people’s movement 
(Shah 2006). The presence of  the Maoists in Odisha has declined 
in recent years, with no activity in five districts.11 In other districts, 
the groups that are active apart from the CPI (M) are the breakaway 
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Odisha Maobadi Party (OMP), and People’s Liberation Front of  
India (PLFI). In West Bengal, where grass-roots politics has been 
well embedded in society, LWE groups are many, with the dominant 
one being CPI (M), and often the boundaries between grass-roots 
movements and LWE are blurred.
In addition, a generational shift is emerging in tribal areas of  all states: 
increasingly the younger generation of  tribals and landless labourers 
no longer want to continue farming or depending upon forests for 
livelihoods, and challenge old customs (deference to elders, marriage 
laws, etc.) (Shah 2011). Such youth are joining LWE groups, where 
they can get a taste of  power gained by direct action of  looting from 
landlords, moneylenders, or state-subsidised fair price shops (Ramana 
2008; Thivet 2014). These similarities and variations in the nature of  
LWE shape the nature of  interactions with the RTF and the potential 
for it to grow deep roots in each state.
The Indian state, for its part, has oscillated between defining the Maoist 
movement as a ‘law and order’ problem and as a socioeconomic problem. 
In its ‘law and order’ framing, the state uses the repressive weight of  the 
security forces to address Maoist-led insurgency. In its socioeconomic 
problem framing, Giri (2009: 465) argues that the state has defined the 
Maoists through three lenses over time – first as the byproduct of  the 
failure of  the ‘development model’ of  the state; second as fighting for 
the rights of  the poor and marginalised; and last, recognising them as 
an alternative political formation inspired by the need to find common 
ground between LWE groups and the state agencies.12
This latter reading of  the state’s view echoes with the view of  the left. 
The Indian left has argued that the government has long used the 
‘Maoist threat’ to justify the rise of  the security-centric state. The Indian 
left continues to critique the repressive capitalistic neoliberal state, but 
their position is one of  accommodation within a democratic framing. 
Giri (2009) argues that this understanding of  the Maoist movement by 
the Indian state and the Indian left shifts the discourse, from it being a 
security problem to it being a socioeconomic issue, which can be resolved 
by better state intervention. This clearly serves to ‘exclude them [the 
Naxalites] out’ as a political alternative (ibid.: 463). Thus, as we will see, 
not only are there differences between the positions of  different factions 
within the Naxalite movement, but there are a multitude of  positions 
towards them from the Indian state and from those on the Indian left, 
that coexist and shape the contested terrain of  Indian politics.
4 Taking the campaign to the states
The RTF campaign faced several challenges in reaching out to states 
where there was a significant Naxalite presence. First, these were states 
where a comprehensive platform of  food-related issues had not been 
on the agenda for development practitioners. Existing groups focused 
often on only part of  the problem; for example, groups working on 
child rights which took on midday meal issues, or groups working on 
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transparency which looked at corruption within the PDS. Further, in 
these states, issues of  tribal rights to land and forests loomed large and 
were the issues around which the many groups mobilised. The challenge 
then, was to bring various activists together under a comprehensive 
‘right to food’ framing.
Second, substantial parts of  these states were affected by conflict due to 
the use of  violent tactics by the LWEs, making it more difficult for the 
work of  the RTF oriented to peaceful rights claims. The uneven presence 
of  the state and state programmes, the multiplicity and ambiguity of  
different groups, and the challenges of  establishing credibility with the 
local populations were hurdles that the RTF campaign had to overcome.
Third, in these settings, the state already had an extremely distrustful 
view of  civil society organisations, viewing them as thinly disguised 
terrorist organisations. As we shall see, any criticism of  the state, or 
demands for accountability, made the RTF campaign vulnerable to 
being labelled as LWEs. Finally, these locations were among the poorest 
states in India, which meant that although they were the ones with 
the greatest need, they were also those with the most limited capacity 
and resources for full implementation of  the right to food, even if  they 
were politically committed to doing so. Evidence from our interviews, 
recounted below, presents an account of  how the RTF campaign 
navigated this shifting and uncertain terrain.
4.1 Linking with grass-roots groups
In the early 2000s, bringing the RTF movement to the local level in the 
conflict-affected areas revolved around forging links with existing groups. 
In one state, people who had been involved with literacy issues joined 
the RTF campaign. In another, the focus of  one group had been on 
dalit rights. The coalitions at state level thus included a range of  issues 
such as health care, violence against women, forest rights, maternal and 
childcare, or agricultural workers. These groups came together because 
the RTF campaign offered something for everyone, an overlap with their 
issues of  concern. In the three states we examined, the RTF campaign 
usually started with a small set of  core organisations that led the work in 
the state.
Initially, many groups in the state-level campaigns were funded by 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs).13 Yet, over 
the years, with shrinking space for social activism, it was precarious 
to accept INGO funding, and simultaneously INGOs retreated from 
support of  overt challenges to the state. As one activist noted: ‘At the 
time it was fine by these funded organisations to work on rights-based 
issues, but now they have become scared’.14 Some even viewed INGOs 
with suspicion: ‘We have had funding agencies wanting to blatantly 
break the campaign. It was always a non-funded campaign’.15
From early on, the preference was to work with existing grass-roots 
groups which were working on some part of  the right to food agenda. 
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As an activist noted,
We focused particularly on organisations that have a mass base. This is because 
we think that this is not NGO-type work. The moment you involve NGOs then 
the spirit is gone. The NGOs are always very worried about their future, about 
projects, FCRA [Foreign Contribution Regulation Act] cancellation. They 
also tend to do only awareness and mobilisation, and mostly avoid doing active 
struggle.16
This sentiment was echoed by another interviewee:
For us, also we feel it is better that we move away from funded organisations to 
include individuals and people who directly want to work with us… Basically 
we are now moving from being an NGO-based campaign to become a more 
people/mass-based campaign.17
In India, the 1980s saw the advent of  NGOs, with the central 
government recognising their role as a delivery agency for rural 
development. They mushroomed over the next two decades and 
have been distinct from large social and peoples’ movements. They 
have been funded and staffed with professionals, in contrast to the 
social movements, which have remained non-funded and based at the 
grass roots. NGOs have over time supported and also participated in 
social movements, but were viewed mostly as outsiders. The general 
perception has been that NGOs are less radical, less critical of  the state, 
and prone to taking decisions based on funding needs (Raina 2004).
This tension persisted and intensified after the amendments to the 
FCRA in 2010 which prohibited NGOs receiving foreign donations 
from undertaking ‘anti-state’ activities. Reflecting this mix of  NGOs 
and movements and in contrast to popular perception, the RTF 
campaign’s grass-roots origins in these states were uneven and varied 
from state to state. National activists invested significantly in reaching 
out to local groups – both social movements and NGOs – to activate 
them around issues of  food. Yet, these efforts were circumscribed by the 
presence of  the LWE groups in the state, an issue we turn to next.
4.2 Presence of left-wing extremism
The scale and extent of  left-wing extremist activity varies from state 
to state, and for the most part LWE groups are present only in some 
blocks/districts of  the state, while RTF campaign work is more 
widespread. By and large, LWE groups did not counter the growing 
influence of  the RTF campaign as it expanded, as Chandra points out 
in the case of  Jharkhand: ‘Non-governmental organizations are rarely, 
if  ever, stopped from working for grass-roots development’ (Chandra 
2013: 57). Rather, LWE groups often remained unseen and the RTF 
campaigns coexisted somewhat uneasily, aware of  their presence. In one 
state, an RTF activist noted, ‘The presence of  these groups (Maoists) is 
invisible by and large. The main activities of  these groups are concerned 
with the security forces’.18 Yet the same activist noted that in some 
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pockets, ‘The entire area is under the control of  the Maoists. In these 
areas, there is no presence of  [the] RTF campaign, and I don’t think that 
they would be allowed either’.19 In state Y, a state with tracts of  forested 
areas completely under LWE control, our interviewee stated that,
The core RTF and the core violence of  those two areas are very different. The 
reason being that initially again, the presence of  civil society groups in those 
[the LWE] areas was very thin. And those that were there, were pushed out 
by the state. It was not feasible for activist groups to remain active there on 
any issue.20
And yet, he noted, ‘For the RTF this has been a sore point, that there 
was never a feasible strategy of  how to cover those areas’.21 In state X by 
contrast, the RTF worked ‘more or less everywhere or rather anywhere’.22
Several activists challenge the narrative of  widespread LWE-led 
terror and believe that the state was using the presence of  LWE as 
an excuse to repress populations and censor civil society groups. One 
interviewee observed that the government was deliberately exaggerating 
the presence of  LWEs for its own ends. ‘We are in the block that is 
considered to be Naxal affected, but we have not seen their presence 
that much. We feel that it is a myth, a myth that has been created to 
terrorise the area. It’s a myth created by the state’.23 In state Y, our 
interviewee noted that, ‘On paper a lot of  the districts are classified 
as LWE… But actually, the violence-affected areas are very small’.24 
Another pointed out that,
Certain parts of  the state have the presence of  Naxalite groups, but these groups 
too are also forced to take a line supporting the people’s demands, apart from 
their own agenda of  armed struggle. Unfortunately, the state has a myopic view 
that treats every resistance by people and every civil society criticism as ‘Maoist’ 
influenced, and tries to tackle these with military repression. This leaves very 
little space for civil society work.25
Making the same point, another noted, ‘If  you do activism, you can be 
branded a Naxal. It is a convenient excuse for the state to come down 
on any form of  activism’.26 Depending upon who is being pilloried, 
an activist from state Z noted, ‘They [the government] at times call 
me the NGO-wala, and at other times they call me Maoist’.27 Overall, 
activists felt that the presence of  Naxals was reducing the space for any 
movement on socioeconomic rights.
The RTF reaction to such labelling by the state was hard-hitting. When 
an RTF activist was implicated in an incident of  violence and branded 
a Naxal, the campaign took an assertive stand denying any links with 
the LWE. ‘We went aggressive, because we felt that if  we didn’t put our 
foot down now, we would be dragged into all kinds of  activities that 
Maoists were involved in’.28 In another state, the RTF was proactive in 
addressing the challenge of  the LWE, which proved to be a successful 
strategy for carving out an independent space.
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The RTF reached out to the Maoist groups. They published pamphlets with 
clear messages which communicated with the Maoist groups by saying that 
‘they’ need to address basic and essential issues of  people. They cannot expect 
the most deprived to be part of  a movement to overthrow the state when they 
are struggling to get one square meal for their families. After the campaign, the 
Maoist groups also started respecting the work of  the RTF and since then they 
have never interfered.29
Yet others observe that LWE groups also have occasionally taken 
up issues of  raising minimum wages and implementation of  the 
MGNREGA (Chandra 2013).
The challenge, though, for the RTF campaign is that, on the ground, 
the lines between various factions of  the LWE groups, civil society 
organisations, and grass-roots movements are rather blurred. In an 
environment where the local state is weak and possibly captured, 
alliances and adversaries are fluid and changing:
In [X] state, there is a general problem of  criminalisation, corruption, and 
extreme backwardness… Sometimes there is some sort of  a nexus between the 
Maoists, pseudo-Maoists, anti-maoists, police-sponsored gangs, and all kinds 
of  factions. Basically, in these areas, democratic institutions are not functioning, 
and that makes the situation worse.30
5 Competition or coexistence?
The presence of  LWE in areas where the RTF campaign is increasingly 
active raises the question of  whether the groups compete for the support 
of  the local population, and how the LWE groups view the work of  
the RTF campaign and vice versa. As highlighted earlier, for the most 
part, they seem to be operating independently, sometimes in the same 
locations. Two factors seem to maintain this separation: on the one side, 
the perspective of  the LWE groups on working with state institutions 
and programmes such as the PDS, and on the other side, the relative 
lower priority for the RTF campaign regarding raising issues of  land 
rights, though in some states they are raising issues of  forest rights.
As others have pointed out, in contrast to mainstream communist 
groups that have focused on rights over natural resources and to 
minimum wages as a step towards Indian socialism, LWE groups 
view the primary power structures in rural India as semi-feudal, 
with the Indian state continuing the feudal traditions of  the colonial 
state (Prasad 2010). Thus, LWE groups are against the state itself, 
rather than attempting to make the state responsive. Similarly, rather 
than critique capitalism and neoliberal policies, LWE groups are 
not ‘against the intrusion of  the market’, a point illustrated by their 
position on the issue of  forest produce such as tendu patta which was 
nationalised by the government with set prices (ibid.: 13). Their struggle 
was to denationalise, and force middlemen in the market to pay 
reasonable prices.
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These positions are unsurprisingly instrumental. As Prasad notes, ‘The 
attitude of  the “Maoists” towards traders and contractors was guided by 
meeting the short-term interests of  the tribal people in order to organize 
them in their support’ (ibid.: 13). The LWE strategy of  supporting their 
own cadres is based on divisions between the chhapparmar zone (raiding 
zone) and the ‘liberated’ areas where they are in full control. The main 
source of  income is by imposing informal taxation (rangdari) on people 
and natural resources in the raiding zone (Prasad 2010; Chandra 2013). 
Such organisation of  LWE groups goes some way in explaining their 
attitudes to the RTF campaign.
Thus, for the most part, the RTF campaign has found little interference 
in their work, as basic needs of  the marginalised, such as food, cannot 
be opposed without invoking the antagonism of  local populations. To 
illustrate, one activist pointed out,
They don’t think much of  these schemes [food entitlement programmes]. 
But they wouldn’t undermine it either. They know that food is important for 
people. So if  that’s the case, then their presence makes no difference to us. They 
don’t interfere with the RTF campaign either. The RTF campaign works in 
many areas which has presence of  Maoist groups.31
Foremost, the lack of  interest also stems from their political position. 
LWE groups do not want to back or improve any initiatives taken by the 
government for food security. One RTF activist noted,
They think of  us as reformists who are talking nonsense… they think of  
the RTF as some NGO initiative that negotiates with the government for 
things. That is their biggest contention with us, the fact that we are constantly 
negotiating with the government.32
Some view such a position as having lost them some support:
It is a bit of  their lack of  thinking. If  they would have supported MGNREGA 
and opposed criminal siphoning of  money, they would have gained a lot of  ground 
support. But for them, anything that is within the system is not worth it.33
Instead we were told, ‘The Maoists, the party, does not interfere with 
these schemes and programmes. They take money from the contractors 
and vendors, so far as I know they would not interfere with the PDS or 
MGNREGA’.34
Yet, on occasion, the two sides have worked on the same issues, albeit 
not together:
The left groups are also acknowledging the need to address basic people’s 
issue. Say, when the hunger deaths happened, we responded. These incidents 
have made them realise that people need food and they can’t keep waiting for 
revolution on empty stomach. They are also engaging on these issues.35
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In another state, ‘The Maoist groups have tacitly supported our work. 
For instance, during the hunger death incidents, the Maoist groups 
also worked to supply food grains in the village; before this they would 
mostly remain ignorant to such incidents’.36
Beyond non-interference with groups working on basic needs such as 
the RTF, LWE groups also surprisingly found that the RTF movement 
did not intrude on a core issue that they were advancing, that of  land 
rights. Such a position from the RTF movement, particularly in these 
states, needs some explanation. Although the issue of  land rights (and 
related forest rights) and reforms underpin food security and have 
always been on the broader agenda of  the RTF movement, with the 
exception of  a few groups they have not been taken up actively.37
One reason for this was that the RTF movement originated from the 
PUCL case and the orders that flowed from that, and the broadening 
of  the campaign issues only occurred later. A related possibility, one that 
we could not confirm, was that the RTF movement, through the PUCL 
case, was engaging with the state around resources it already had, 
whereas the issue of  land rights and natural resources run up against 
powerful private and political interests, and therefore lack political 
champions. Yet another reason was that, as discussed earlier, civil society 
groups in these states are viewed with suspicion, and any group that 
called for land rights could be dubbed terrorists and their work would 
be hindered. As an activist noted,
The RTF has moved from agitation to strategic intervention, where they oppose 
the government a lot more on paper, but also work with them and make alliances 
with them strategically to improve the implementation of  different schemes… The 
confrontational mode limits the degree of  intervention.38
Or as another activist from another state put it:
RTF has maintained a strategic relationship with the government. They work 
hand in hand with the state and influence policy matters. Therefore, as a strategy 
they often avoid getting into an overtly conflicting situation with the state… as they 
have been able to acquire space to work within the system, they would rather not 
compromise the space.39
Yet, in state Y, there was some disagreement on this from one of  our 
interviewees. He noted, ‘The areas of  land rights and the areas of  
Naxals, those are also very different’.40 The argument was that in that 
state, the tribals were not being displaced from their lands, there was no 
mining happening there – it was in other locations that the land issues 
were salient, yet those were not LWE-dominated.
Although the collective statement of  the RTF campaign does state the 
importance of  land, it could have greater emphasis. Some activists saw 
it as a missed opportunity:
Criticism has always been there from left groups as well as groups working on 
displacements and land right issues. They always tell us that we revolve around 
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the government and on schemes and subsidies. We do little to question larger issues 
of  inequality and inequity, issues of  land and displacement. But we are also 
moving towards that. We feel that it is needed to address these issues, but there is 
need to address basic needs of  people like food and ration. We are thus moving 
from the food security to food sovereignty.41
I think, we as the campaign have failed to make these connections. The connections 
between dispossessions and people’s claims on local natural resources on the one 
hand and the demand for entitlement of  say, food and employment on the other. I 
think the main reason is that in the case of  displacement movements, the state is 
seen as the enemy, it is in fact the enemy, but that is not the only role that the state 
plays. It also plays a constructive role. When we are making claims on the state, 
the assumption is that the state is in a constructive role. I think there is no tension 
in seeing that the state has on the one hand a repressive role and on the other hand 
a constructive role. But for most people, it’s one or the other. That is the tension 
and the gap that we have not been able to address. But it can be done.42
Since the election of  2014, with a massive Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) victory at the national level, there has been a shift in the political 
environment, with a government that is friendly to business groups and 
which views conventional civil society as threatening. The subnational 
level too has seen changes of  government, which combined with the 
reluctance of  the central government to support rights, has meant that 
RTF campaigns in these states have lost valuable allies. These allies until 
then had enabled them to collaborate and at the same time advocate 
and demand accountability. Since 2014, there has been a shift from 
the previous government’s support for rights-based legislations and 
schemes that they had introduced. Though instances of  land acquisition 
and mass-scale displacement had begun post-1990s, the biggest 
displacement struggle43 due to the Sardar Saravor Dam has intensified 
in the last five years. Coupled with threats of  targeting and surveillance 
by the government on members of  civil society participating in so-called 
‘anti-state’ activities, this lack of  support for rights-based approaches 
has further led to shrinking democratic space (Chandhoke 2017). As a 
result, the RTF campaigns in the states are working on smaller issues 
that can sustain the momentum of  the campaign, while not invoking the 
wrath of  the state. Strategies have shifted:
There are softer forms of  action, writing to the collector, organising a meeting. 
We avoid such actions, such as sitting on hunger strike, it gets noticed by 
media… it is more confrontational… so, do smaller forms that are viewed as 
less threatening.44
In such a context, the presence of  LWE has seriously reduced the space 
for any action, and the outlook for further expansion of  rights-based 
work is poor.
6 Conclusions
This article has traced how a relatively successful national campaign on 
the Right to Food reached back to mobilise support at the grass roots 
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in new locations; particularly those affected by fragility, conflict, and 
violence. The process, as we saw, involved a meeting in the middle, 
where the RTF brought new framings and issues to existing groups 
that were already working with vulnerable populations. The ability of  
the newly formed networks around food at the state level to mobilise 
support, however, depended upon the reaction of  the armed groups to 
such work. In the case of  the LWE-affected states in India, they coexist 
without infringing on the spaces being occupied by the other.
The perception of  the state towards LWE serves to enable their 
coexistence. LWE groups are seen by the state simultaneously 
as benevolent actors striving to bring justice to the people most 
marginalised by the neoliberal state, while at the same time as a security 
threat due to the ‘means’ that they use. This perception, and the 
strategy of  the RTF campaign to work with the state, provides both 
RTF and LWE ideological common ground to coexist and cooperate in 
delivering rights and entitlements to a marginalised population rather 
than being in conflict with each other.
Moreover, the passage of  the National Food Security Act in 2013, 
and the change of  government in 2014 has further complicated the 
contested political field between the democratic state, the Maoist 
movements, and the RTF campaign in India. For the RTF movement, it 
has sharpened the focus of  its campaigns at the state level, as there is a 
greater role for monitoring the implementation of  the act and ensuring 
better access for the people to its entitlements. However, with the overall 
shift to a hostile political environment for civil society groups carrying 
out accountability work since the election of  the BJP government in 
2014, both LWE groups as well as civil society have had to rethink their 
strategies. How the new dynamics will play out in the long run remains 
to be seen.
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1 Anuradha Joshi, Research Fellow, Institute of  Development Studies, 
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3 In this article we use the term left-wing extremism (LWE) or left-wing 
extremist groups (LWE groups), Maoists, or Naxals interchangeably, 
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to indicate a large number of  organisations inspired by Maoist 
ideology, and whose primary aim was to foster revolution against 
state structures. These groups are colloquially called Naxalites. 
All forms of  Naxalite organisations have been deemed terrorist 
organisations under Indian law.
4 Exceptions include the short section devoted to this by Birchfield and 
Corsi (2010: 723); Krishnan and Subramaniam (2014); and more 
recently Pande and Houtzager (2016).
5 We carried out interviews with national- and state-level activists of  
the RTF campaign between late 2017 and early 2018. The names 
of  the interviewees as well as the names of  the states have been 
anonymised for protection of  the interviewees. For obvious reasons, 
we did not interview people from the LWE groups, and this is one of  
the limitations of  the analysis presented here.
6 RTF foundation statement, see www.righttofoodcampaign.in/about/
foundation-statement.
7 See newspaper pieces at www.righttofoodcampaign.in/food-act/
articles.
8 See www.righttofoodcampaign.in/events.
9 The Fifth Schedule states that all scheduled areas of  the country 
which are forest reserves and inhabited by scheduled tribes are to 
be administered by the governors of  the states by appointing 
tribal advisory councils with tribal representatives from the relevant 
forest reserve or scheduled area. The Ninth Schedule of  the 
Constitution dealt with the fact that cultivable land which over 
thousands of  years had come under the ownership of  upper castes 
should be acquired by the government and redistributed among 
India’s landless peasantry.
10 The latter is banned and operates underground, though it has ‘open 
fronts’ which continue to function.
11 https://odishapolice.gov.in/?q=node/69.
12 The argument is based on a close reading of  a report commissioned 
by the Planning Commission (2008).
13 The RTF campaign itself  is not funded by any national or 
international organisation. See www.righttofoodcampaign.in/about/
finance.
14 Phone interview conducted with interviewee JB, 28 October 2017.
15 Interview conducted with interviewee FJ, 15 September 2017, New 
Delhi.
16 Interview conducted with interviewee FJ, 15 September 2017, New 
Delhi.
17 Phone interview conducted with interviewee JB, 28 October 2017.
18 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
19 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
20 Phone interview conducted with interviewee AJ, 7 January 2018.
21 Phone interview conducted with interviewee AJ, 7 January 2018.
22 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
23 Interview conducted with interviewee FJ, 15 September 2017, New 
Delhi.
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24 Phone interview conducted with interviewee AJ, 7 January 2018.
25 Written interview conducted with interviewee CT, 16 November 2017.
26 Phone interview conducted with interviewee AJ, 7 January 2018.
27 Interview conducted with interviewee FJ, 15 September 2017, New 
Delhi.
28 Interview conducted with interviewee FJ, 15 September 2017, New 
Delhi.
29 Phone interview conducted with interviewee SD, 2 November 2017.
30 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
31 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
32 Interview conducted with interviewee FJ, 15 September 2017, New 
Delhi.
33 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
34 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
35 Phone interview conducted with interviewee JB, 28 October 2017.
36 Phone interview conducted with interviewee SD, 2 November 2017.
37 For example, in the 2004 convention in Bhopal, Jean Drèze 
noted, ‘Land rights is another issue on which a strong need was 
felt for coordinated action. Various proposals were made at the 
workshop on “land rights and food sovereignty” and concrete 
decisions on this are likely to be taken quite soon at follow-up 
gatherings’. See https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl2114/
stories/20040716006012500.htm. Yet these have not featured 
prominently in RTF campaign demands.
38 Phone interview conducted with interviewee JB, 28 October 2017.
39 Phone interview conducted with interviewee SD, 2 November 2017.
40 Phone interview conducted with interviewee AJ, 7 January 2018.
41 Phone interview conducted with interviewee JB, 28 October 2017.
42 Phone interview conducted with interviewee PK, 12 September 2017.
43 Displacement figures estimate more than 50,000 people across three 
states of  Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra,  
www.narmada.org/sardar-sarovar/sc.ruling/Displacement.rehab.html.
44 Phone interview conducted with interviewee AJ, 7 January 2018.
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